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In all democratic systems, intelligence reform is a ‘‘Gordian knot’’ that
incessantly tests decisionmakers. The onus is on them to develop and
maintain inte l l igence systems that protect democracy and are
democratically accountable, while, at the same time, engage in secret
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operations. This challenge has no clear solution. As experts at the Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) put it, ‘‘the
nature of intelligence is such that the balance between secrecy and
democracy will always be a delicate one to strike.’’1 In well-established
democracies, policymakers have developed mechanisms to tackle the
‘‘democracy–intelligence’’ dilemma, yet these mechanisms are relentlessly
being revised and reworked. In new democracies, however, decisionmakers
must create these mechanisms from ground zero, and do not always
succeed in balancing effectiveness with transparency. In those that do
succeed, decisionmakers face numerous challenges, yet they may, after long
and protracted endeavors, eventually manage to accommodate effectiveness
and transparency. Both interest and willingness (whether self-initiated or
due to outside pressure and=or incentives) on the part of policymakers are
paramount in successful intelligence reform.
Here we analyze the experiences of seven developing democracies: Brazil,
Argentina, Peru, Poland, Romania, Spain, and Russia.2 In all but one,
policymakers have succeeded in institutionalizing intelligence agencies that
are either transparent or effective, or both. In stark contrast, in the
seventh country, Russia, policymakers have not been interested in
democratic consolidation, and while they invested in intelligence reform,
they did so for personal gain, not for reasons of democratic consolidation.
RELEVANCE
Research and literature on intelligence in developing democracies are
emerging yet still scarce. Although a rich literature is available on
intelligence in the Western, long-established democracies, only a few
studies have been done on intelligence in the newer democracies. For
example, in five of the most widely used and recent anthologies or
handbooks on intelligence, with a total of 161 chapters, only 22 deal
with intelligence in countries that have made the transition from
dictatorship to democracy. A very comprehensive bibliography on
intelligence, titled ‘‘Intelligence and Policy-Making: A Bibliography,’’
prepared and periodically updated by Greta Marlatt of the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) library for teaching and research purposes,
also reveals that, of the over five hundred books, reports, and documents
listed, only some thirty deal with newer democracies.3 And the existing
studies of intelligence in new democracies focus almost exclusively on
democratic control, not on effectiveness. In our work with the Center for
Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) and the National Security Affairs
(NSA) Department within the NPS at Monterey, California, we learned
that in many countries, policymakers, for various reasons, either do not
care, or even if they do, do not know how to deal with intelligence reform.
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Even in more mature democracies, interest or expertise on how to deal with
intelligence reform is often lacking.4
Moreover, in many new democracies, the polemic has developed about the
term information versus intelligence (in Romania) and vice versa (in
Portugal). In Romania, for example, the word ‘‘intelligence’’ refers strictly
to ‘‘cleverness,’’ and intelligence agencies have always been called
‘‘information agencies’’ or ‘‘secret services.’’ Admittedly, in the twenty-first
century and in a democratic society, agencies do more than gather
information. From this perspective, Romanian intelligence practitioners
and policymakers are currently endeavoring to introduce ‘‘intelligence’’
into the vocabulary. In Portugal, the term during the Salazar’s non-
democratic regime was ‘‘intelligence,’’ so that the currently acceptable term
is ‘‘information.’’ The reverse is true in Brazil, where the National
Information Service has been replaced in the democracy by the Brazilian
Intelligence Agency (ABIN).
The lack of interest and investment in striking a balance between
effectiveness and transparency can result in either intelligence illegalities
and abuses or a failure to protect national security and democratic values
in the older as much as in the newer democracies (e.g., the United States,
United Kingdom, Spain, India, etc.). Policymakers and intelligence
professionals in developed democracies are increasingly encouraging
cooperation with newer democracies so as to avert national and global
security threats. Decisionmakers in the developed democracies must be
confident that they can share information with compatible, capable, and
accountable intelligence agencies from newer democracies.
This article seeks to improve the literature on intelligence reform in new
democracies and to respond to the need for confidence in both the
achievement of accountability and effectiveness.
THE INTELLIGENCE FUNCTION AND THE ROLE OF POLICYMAKERS
Intelligence5 is a three-tiered element of national security. It is (1) a Process
by which certain types of information (e.g., security threats, strategic threat
estimates, future capabilities projections, indication and warning) are
required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated to decision=
policymakers, and by which certain types of covert action are conceived
and conducted; (2) an Organization, with units that execute the
intelligence functions (process and product); and (3) a Product of these
processes and organizations (e.g., analyses, intelligence estimates). The
purpose of intel l igence is to serve, inform, assist, and support
policymakers’ decisions, as well as to provide support to operations and
other security organizations. Hence, intelligence entails both information
and response.6
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Intelligence is also a cycle (Figure 1) of various functions on behalf
of national security policymakers, reflecting their needs, requirements,
and benefits. Requirements are elements of the direction, planning, and
guidance of the entire intelligence function and activity by decision- and
policymakers such as the President, the Prime Minister, the National
Security Council, the National Intelligence Board, various Ministries
involved with national security, or other government institutions.
Information and data are collected from secret and open sources, such as
human, communication, imagery, and cyber. The raw information and
data are selected, processed, and converted into a manageable format for
the development of finished intelligence, including translation and
decryption. Then, the fusion, production, and analysis takes place, which
involves merger, combination, integration, examination, assessment, and
analysis by the intelligence analysts of all processed and exploited data and
information, as well as the preparation of varied intelligence products,
generally based on the decisionmakers’ requirements and preferences. The
final product is disseminated to policymakers who will make decisions and
draw policies, which may or may not start another cycle with additional
requirements.
The uniqueness of the intelligence sector as compared to, for example,
other branches of government is that its functions are centered in, and
Figure 1. Intelligence Cycle. (Figure appears in color online.)
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intended for, the state, and are most often secret. The central tenets of
intelligence are timeliness, accuracy, completeness, usability, and relevance.
Informed policymakers need adequate information on known and
unknown security risks, as well as reliable and usable analysis (sometimes
tailor-built to the specific needs and requirements of a particular
decisionmaker), on time or ‘‘at the right time.’’ Without intelligence,
policymakers cannot make informed decisions regarding national security
and defense.
Policymakers are an integral part of the cycle: they are the ‘‘alpha’’ and
‘‘omega’’ of the intelligence function. They start the cycle through
requirements and guidance and keep it working by providing feedback.
They also end the cycle by taking relevant national security decisions
and policies. As author Robert Kennedy has argued, ‘‘ ‘Art of
Intelligence’ begins not with analysis, but with judgments that lead to
the selection of the information to be sought, permeates every phase of
the intelligence process, and ends with judgments by key officials on how
to use the information received.’’7 Feedback and dialogue between
intelligence producers and customers are cardinal. Policymakers need to
make their needs clear to intelligence agencies, let the intelligence
professionals know how accurate, useful, and tailored to their needs and
requirements the product is, and convey any new guidance or
adjustments to the intelligence cycle (including pointers on how to
improve intel l igence col lect ion and=or analysis to better suit
requirements). The bottom line is to prevent misdirection and waste of
time and resources. As former President Bill Clinton’s second national
security adviser, Samuel R. ‘‘Sandy’’ Berger, put it when talking about
the effectiveness of the intelligence process in the United States, ‘‘things
happen when the number one person is in the room . . .When . . . he goes
back . . . to his agency [and] shakes that agency for whatever it has.’’8
Policymakers cannot surmise about the intentions of the adversary,
traditional or not, without intelligence collection and analysis. Yet, as
Robert Kennedy stated, ‘‘successful analyses depend in the first instance
on effective management not just from within the IC, but also by the
policymakers themselves.’’9 On the same note, Mireille Radoi, a
Romanian scholar specializing in intelligence, states that the performance
of the intelligence contribution to national security is a function of the
‘‘producer–consumer’’ relationship.10 Nevertheless, although a cooperative
and symbiotic11 relationship needs to exist between intelligence producers
and consumers, the bottom line for the intelligence function is to serve
policy without being or becoming politicized, or worse, without
becoming the decisionmakers’ political police, especially in the newer
democracies. Finally, as Dr. Jennifer Sims, a former U.S. State
Department official has noted, ‘‘a high-quality intelligence process
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balances investment and direction from decisionmakers with unbiased
collection and analysis.’’12
WHY SHOULD POLICYMAKERS CARE ABOUT EFFECTIVE
INTELLIGENCE?
Democracies, old and new, need intelligence to fight security challenges
and threats, and to follow global developments. In-depth information
and knowledge are required to understand both the strategic context and
potent ia l securi ty developments , inc luding securi ty r isks and
opportunities, as well as the actions, inactions, motivations, and strategies
of existing and potential adversaries. They can also help predict how
potential allies and partners could help confront these challenges, and are
crucial in defining national interests, developing effective security policies
and strategies, establishing adequate roles and missions for security
forces, and elaborating doctrines and operations.13 They not only help
avert national crises but are important in managing them effectively
when they do arise. Thus decisionmaking uses information as a ‘‘shield’’
or ‘‘weapon’’ against national security threats. Only if policymakers are
adequately informed about the current and future security context can
they be expected to make suitable judgments in the realm of national
security, defense, and foreign relations.14 Without effective intelligence as
the first line of defense against any potential security risk or threat, these
are impossible.
Democracies face myriad security risks and challenges, characterized by
a high degree of uncertainty, unpredictability, and complexity, which
imperil national security. Included are dangers to the rule of law and
good governance, as well as to individual rights and liberties.
Decisionmakers need to comprehend these matters in order to develop
policies and directions that effectively avert, counter, and fight them.
Today, such threats and challenges come less from organized,
hierarchical state actors, and more from non-state, adaptable,
network-centric groups and organizations which have progressively
succeeded in altering the traditional geographic borders between
countries, as well as between domestic and foreign threats. As the
RAND Corporation’s Deborah G. Barger asserts, ‘‘Globalization, the
Internet, and the interconnected economy, once cited as forces for
integration, peace, and stabil i ty, are also creating a world of
extremes.’’15 Such matters include traditional conflict (e.g., between
Russia and Georgia in 2008), organized crime (e.g., post–Cold War
networks of drug, arms, and human traffickers operating virtually
throughout the globe, including South Eastern Europe and Latin
America), terrorism (e.g., Argentina in 1992=1994, Romania in 2006),
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and cyber attacks
whereby electronic data, information, and knowledge are used as a
weapon (e.g., Estonia 2007, Georgia 2008). In recent years, these security
risks have clearly illustrated how instability or the specific ideologies and
religious convictions of small groups of people, can impact the peace
and security of a country, region, or the whole world.
Decisionmakers are required to fight such an unconventional phalanx,
which jeopardizes not only state security, but endangers the very values
of democracy. This nonaligned panoply of threats can rarely be disrupted
by traditional military threat or nuclear deterrence, which some of the
new democracies cannot even begin to afford. Taking the right decisions
and drawing up suitable security policies to counter such threats depend,
among other things, upon the quality of the preliminary work and the
final product prepared by the intelligence agencies. The decisionmakers
need feasible intelligence, assessments, and warning. And they must accept
a certain amount of intelligence secrecy in the ‘‘the name of security.’’16
Policymakers need, therefore, to be interested in having effective
intelligence in order to protect national security and democracy. In a new
democracy, effective intelligence is an even more necessary requirement.
In virtually all nondemocratic regimes the intelligence apparatuses
(whether political police or independent security states) were ‘‘effectively’’
serving the political class by collecting information, relentlessly
monitoring—and frequently abusing and killing—citizens. Effectiveness in
the democratic sense was not an issue during the nondemocratic regime
period. After a regime change, the new agencies have tended17 to preserve
the personnel of the nondemocratic intelligence apparatuses, so
policymakers in the developing democracies need to ensure that the new
agencies effectively serve the security needs of the democratic country, not
of a minority sector.
Policymakers need effective intelligence for the following reasons: (1) to
avoid strategic surprises to the national security, whereby intelligence
anticipates and keeps track of current and potential security risks; (2) to
acquire and capitalize on long-term expertise in defense and security
matters , whereby inte l l igence agencies act as ‘ ‘ l ibrar ies ’ ’ for
decisionmakers, providing a comprehensive database and pool of
expertise on national security issues, as well as ‘‘information brokers,’’
due to the abundance of available information, especially via open
source, which requires rigorous verification by experts; (3) to get
support in the overall policy process whereby intelligence agencies
provide policymakers with tailored and timely intelligence; and (4) to
ensure that the secrecy of information, needs, sources, and methods
required by the intelligence function when protecting national security is
safeguarded.18
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THE IMPORTANCE OF INTELLIGENCE TRANSPARENCY
Nevertheless, championing only intelligence effectiveness may be dangerous
to a democracy. Effectiveness usually depends on secrecy, which may feed
abuse and insulate the agencies from any form of scrutiny—intrinsic or
extrinsic. Since intelligence agencies have access to large amounts of
information and knowledge regarding national security, and since the
information flow is generally unidirectional (from intelligence to state and
society), and sometimes uneven (intelligence agencies may withhold
information), their ‘‘power’’ may rise, and they may refuse to serve
policy, but instead pursue their own objectives. As a consequence,
national security has become ever more dependent on highly effective
intelligence (especially in fighting terrorism), and intelligence agencies
have asked for increased powers and privileges. Because intelligence
professionals and organizations regularly break laws abroad, they may
willingly conflate ‘‘abroad’’ with ‘‘at home’’ and transgress there too. An
additional danger is intelligence politicization, which can happen two
ways: ‘ ‘down’’ (i .e., policymakers ‘ ‘dictate’’ to the intell igence
professionals what product they want); and ‘‘up’’ (with intelligence
professionals willingly providing policymakers with the product they
know the decisionmakers want). Politicization leads to the misuse by the
executive branch, for its own political ends, of intelligence agencies and
their inherent special privileges. With consequences on both accountability
and effectiveness. Characteristic of countries that transitioned from
nondemocratic regimes to democracies is the fact that democratic
consolidation takes time and can always regress as some factions may be
interested in bringing back the nondemocratic regime: intelligence may
help to do so. In addition, the legacy of the nondemocratic past and its
misconduct (particularly in human rights violations for personal or
political reasons=vendettas, not always connected to national security)
may persist after the regime change, in that the retained personnel may
perpetuate such methods or, even worse, teach the new group the old
methods. The danger is that the intelligence agencies might either return
as political police (with the politicians using them to deter and remove
potential political adversaries, control aggressive investigative journalists,
and deflect other possible opponents), or as independent security states,
functioning for their own purposes. This possibility needs vigilance from
policymakers in order to keep the intelligence services insulated from
politics and political parties while serving the state and citizens, and
thereby distancing them from their previous status.
Essentially, policymakers should become interested in intelligence
transparency (including control and oversight) to not only prevent such
wrongdoing as the misuse of the budget and human rights abuses such as
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illegal intrusive actions, but also to help improve intelligence effectiveness via
feedback and recommendations.
POLICYMAKERS AND THE DEMOCRATIC REFORM OF INTELLIGENCE
Democracy calls for politically neutral, transparent, and accountable, yet
effective, intelligence. So, how can policymakers in new democracies
contribute to democratic reform of intelligence agencies? What should they
do to balance the effectiveness of intelligence agencies with transparency,
accountability, and citizens’ liberty? Are there any challenges or obstacles
that hinder their endeavors? How can these be overcome? When, in
comparison with the reform of other state sectors, should they be involved
in the democratic reform of intelligence? Can they do so without
politicizing intelligence?
Democratic reform of intelligence involves a continuum of numerous
intertwining steps and processes toward establishing an institutional
framework whereby democratically elected civilians can control
the intelligence agencies and at the same time maximize their potential for
effectiveness. These should be acceptable to the population that votes for
the politicians who have responsibility for establishing and controlling the
institutions.19 To begin with, policymakers need to create new agencies or
reorganize old ones. To avoid a concentration of power in the hands of
one agency, the newly created agencies should balance foreign with
domestic intelligence, military with civilian, and national defense with
law enforcement. Decisions should also be made regarding to whom
the intelligence product should be disseminated and on what basis. The
creation of intelligence agencies needs to be closely followed by the
crafting of clear and robust legal frameworks, and the updating of any
obsolete legislation, in order to establish intelligence roles and missions in
line with the functioning of intelligence in a democracy. Intelligence-related
legislation should also stipulate methods of control, oversight, and
accountability, as well as promote openness and transparency. The legal
framework must develop from the new democratic structures and
processes, and must endeavor to guarantee, in the realm of intelligence, the
democratic values that they aspire to advance. In line with the previous
two steps, decisionmakers should focus on helping to institutionalize the
effectiveness of intelligence by ensuring competent political direction and
guidance, as well as crafting and implementing security-related plans
(meaning strategies and doctrines) by robust structures and processes such
executive bodies as a National Security Council and appropriate
Ministries. They should also encourage interagency and international
coordination=cooperation, and allocate sufficient resources, consisting of
the political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure that the services have
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sufficient equipment, trained forces, and other assets needed to implement
their assigned roles and missions. In parallel, policymakers should seek to
establish and strengthen institutions and mechanisms for the control and
oversight of the intelligence services, to ensure that the agencies are doing
the right thing, and are, at some level, accountable to the public. If failures
are identified, the oversight mechanisms must be able to take action to
avert future failures.
But democratic control and oversight should not violate the intelligence
agencies’ right of protecting their sources and methods and ongoing
operations. Formal mechanisms of democratic control and oversight of
intelligence agencies may include control by the executive (be it a president,
prime minister, or NSC), the legislative branch through permanent or
temporary committees, the judicial branch, as well as by internal control,
through inspectors general. All should work together to provide ‘‘assurance
of legality, proportionality and propriety’’20 for intelligence personnel,
activities, and resources. These mechanisms may be supported by other
formal institutions that could provide oversight, such as Public Ministries,
Ombudsman offices, and Courts of Audits. Besides the formal mechanisms,
informal mechanisms of oversight by the civi l society through
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), think tanks, academia, and the
media, and lustration mechanisms, as well as international organizations
dealing with human rights issues, can play a key role in overseeing
intelligence, especially when formal mechanisms fall short. In newer
democracies, decisionmakers should be involved in intelligence reform from
the beginning to ensure the development of all these arenas.
CHALLENGES TO POLICYMAKERS
Policymakers face several challenges when attempting to undertake
intelligence reform—some from the agencies, some from within themselves.
Intelligence agencies most frequently attempt to resist democratic reform
for a variety of ideological, political, and bureaucratic reasons. Intelligence
officers also oppose reform because they mistrust the policymakers’
expertise in intelligence, doubt their interest in national security, and
consider too much outside involvement and scrutiny, as well as
transparency, as jeopardizing their agencies’ effectiveness. In addition, and
as a characteristic of new democracies, the legacy of the past tends to
linger years after the regime change. Newly created intelligence agencies
may oppose democratic reform so as to prevent the loss of prerogatives
they had during the nondemocratic regime, as well as to avoid any
potential downsizing, vetting, and retrospective investigation of their past
activities. Since many new intelligence agencies retain old personnel, their
access to information, files, and records may be used to impede democratic
POLICYMAKERS AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM 665
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 24, NUMBER 4
reform. The policymakers themselves may lack interest in, or intentionally
avoid, reforming intelligence. Other reforms may have top priority, those
that may bring in more votes—such as health, education, and economic
development—to the detriment of intelligence, which normally brings in no
votes. The decisionmakers may also wish to be able to deny knowledge of
illegal intelligence operations in order to avoid any possible suspicion that
they tolerate unlawful activities and practices. Or, they may fear that the
intelligence agencies may have some embarrassing information about them,
or, as in the case of new democracies, wish to avoid suspicion of having
been involved in earlier political police activities. Another reason could be
their lack of interest in the actual democratic consolidation of the country;
this would beget democratic regress and employment of strong intelligence
agencies for their own personal gain. Policymakers generally lack
knowledge and expertise on intelligence issues and intelligence reform.
Even in the old democracies, where the debate between liberty and security
has been around for years, policymakers still make mistakes and are
unable to strike the proper balance between effectiveness and transparency.
They fail to understand that intelligence has its limitations and may
sometimes be wrong. As Columbia University professor Robert Jervis
argues, ‘‘Unfortunately, not only will even the best intelligence services be
wrong very often, but when they are true to the available evidence their
reports are likely to be inconclusive, and when they are right they will
often bring disturbing news.’’21 In new democracies, the lack of knowledge
and expertise in intelligence is even more manifest because the new
policymakers generally have no prior exposure to either what intelligence
involves in a democracy or what avenues they need to follow for
intelligence reform. Corruption is another challenge, whether within the
agencies or within the executive and legislative branches of the government.
All these lead to, at a minimum, a ‘‘hands-off’’ attitude toward intelligence
and intelligence reform by decision- and policymakers, or, at a maximum, to
hasty or perfunctory reforms. Neither of these is satisfactory.
Overcoming the Challenges
Of all the previous challenges, interest in intelligence reform is the most
demanding. An ignorance of intelligence can have grave policy and
security consequences. What incentives do decisionmakers then have to
reform intelligence? A first possible incentive is personal prestige and
recognition. They may wish to remain in history as ‘‘pioneers’’ of
opportune and=or successful intelligence reforms.22 Or, they may seek to
secure for their country the role of regional hegemon, or, as with Brazil,
as a contributor to PSO, and, in the newer democracies, to prevent a
return to a nondemocratic past. A second possible incentive for
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decisionmakers is an awareness and understanding of security threats, as
well as the importance of their own role in the cycle for successful
security policies. As in Brazil they can learn of these on their own, or be
prompted by an emerging or past security crisis=disaster, as, for example,
the United States and Argentina, after terrorist attacks. A third possible
incentive is the receipt of financial support and assistance from other
countries. Related to this is an external drive, such as the membership
requirements of various regional security cooperation agencies, notably
NATO and the EU, along with pressure from domestic and international
media and public opinion. Any combination of these potential incentives
could interest decisionmakers in reforming intelligence.
With a certain amount of political will, whether motivated by outside
incentives or personal reasons, policymakers can overcome challenges and
achieve significant progress in the democratic reform of intelligence. They
can improve democratic control capabilit ies and strengthen the
effectiveness of intelligence work. Doing so involves developing additional
principles and practices to boost the effectiveness of the intelligence
agencies and strengthen the democratic nature of control and oversight
through such avenues as: fostering an intelligence and security culture;
raising public interest in intelligence and security matters; and increasing
civilian expertise in intelligence by allowing access to unclassified literature,
educating and training personnel in intelligence (jointly with foreign and
domestic counterparts and representatives of civil society); capitalizing on
the expertise of support staff; and generating a public debate on
intelligence reform, and professional intelligence agencies, by open and
rigorous recruitment, education and training, career planning, leadership,
interagency cooperation, and investing in analysis (e.g., in critical and
imaginative thinking). In all these, feedback is crucial. As previously
mentioned, if failures occur, policymakers must help intelligence learn from
past mistakes and improve.
GLOBAL EXPERIENCES: SEVEN CASE STUDIES
Original research is here offered on six countries where the issue of
intelligence and=or intelligence reform has been addressed. Located in
different regions of the world, they are at different stages of democratic
transition or consolidation and confront different national security and
defense challenges. Each is discussed with the intention of drawing lessons
regarding the contribution, if any, of policymakers to intelligence reform,
noting as well the obstacles to balancing intelligence effectiveness with
transparency.23 These cases were selected as examples of reform, but in
most countries, policymakers are unable to contribute to reform or are not
at all interested in intelligence.
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Brazil
Brazil began its democratic reform of intelligence in 1990 with the
inauguration of President Fernando Collor de Mello, who extinguished
the SNI and the SISNI, considered the ‘‘evils’’ of the nondemocratic
regime. This constituted the most critical and basic reform in the
Brazilian intelligence system. Since the abolition of SNI, officers and
officials from the Executive Branch—namely the President, the Secretariat
for Institutional Security (GSI), other Ministers, Commanders of the
Armed Forces, the Chief of General-Staff, as well as and members of the
legislative chambers have strived to bring about a new intelligence system.
Brazil now has, at least on paper, an extensive intelligence system, the
Sistema Brasileiro de Inteligencia (SISBIN), composed of some twenty
different organizations, either parts of various ministries or independent,
including the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agencia Brasileira de
Inteligencia—ABIN)24 created on the ruins of the SNI in 1999 as the
central agency of the system (though it supposely operates under the
coordination of the GSI).25 These organizations are both military and
civilian including law enforcement, and conduct domestic and foreign
intelligence. Policymakers established a legal framework that stipulates the
intelligence agencies’ roles and missions for safeguarding the Brazilian
citizenry, and not only the state itself. The legislation also determines
their relationship with policy—to serve policy but be politically neutral.
The legal framework also provides for domestic interagency coordination
and cooperation, whereby ABIN is the central agency of SISBIN,
operating under the Institutional Security Secretariat of the Presidency of
the Republic (GSI), as well as foreign cooperation and sharing. Also
established were several mechanisms of democratic control and oversight
of intelligence: (1) internal and agency control through the director of
ABIN; (2) Executive control and oversight, through the Minister of the
Secretariat of Institutional Security, assisted by an advisory board
Chamber of Foreign Affairs and Defense (CREDEN) to monitor
intelligence policy implementation, as well as through the GSI for all the
intelligence agencies; (3) Legislative control and oversight, through the
Joint Committee for the Control of Intelligence Activities (CCAI); and,
(4) a Public Prosecutor’s Office, as watchdog against misconduct of
public or even private officials.
Brazil’s post-authoritarian intelligence system has been the creation of
civilian policymakers: a roundtable process involving the drafting of
proposals and legislation for new intelligence agencies, review and debates
by members of Congress, and approval by Congress. The incentives were
personal for many of the proponents as they sought to avoid a return to
the non-democratic past. The reformers have been interested and focused,
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at least until recently, only on strengthening the accountability, legality, and
transparency of the intelligence community, and very little on its
effectiveness. From the start, their main preoccupation was how to
construct an agency that differed from the SNI in terms of structure,
procedures, and orientation. Many questions had to be answered: Would
one service deal with both foreign and security intelligence, or would
creation of two separate agencies be preferable? How should intelligence
officials be recruited and trained? What should be done with personnel
from the authoritarian regime still working in the service? And, most
important, how could the political establishment avoid the possibility of a
secret service becoming a menace to democracy and society? Effectiveness,
therefore, was not a high priority for the decisionmakers, whose
understanding of the role of ‘‘effective’’ intelligence in a democracy was
minimal. For many years these civilians saw intelligence as more a threat
to democracy than a protector of the state and society. In addition, after
the Cold War when the traditional ‘‘enemy’’ vanished, policymakers in
Brazil, as in many other democracies, considered intelligence useless. Thus,
the very new concern with intelligence effectiveness was prompted by their
awareness of nontraditional threats such as extensive violence by organized
crime in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sa˜o Paulo, and potential threats to
global sports events with large international participation which can make
Brazil a target. Prestige was an additional incentive, due to awareness of the
country’s greater projection on the world stage as a result of its very
successful and high-profile peacekeeping in Haiti.
For Brazil, balancing intelligence agencies’ transparency with effectiveness
has been a challenging process. First to be overcome was the legacy of its
awful past experience with the SNI, which was a state within a state. Due
to past abuses and human rights violations (which society still tends to
associate with national security, defense, and intelligence), neither Brazilian
society nor policymakers have been willing to support intelligence
effectiveness. Second was the leaders’ lack of knowledge. Development has
been rather slow and drawn out due to political weakness and fecklessness
in the executive branch between 1990 and 1995, and the slow emergence of
interest in the issue of intelligence by members of the legislative branch.
More recently, policymakers have been implementing changes in the
intelligence community and its oversight mechanisms. To foster a political
culture that supports and respects intelligence, including better knowledge
and understanding by civilians, and improving intelligence professionalism,
the CCAI, especially when Severiano Alves became Chairman, has met
with the intelligence community on a regular basis to discuss, among
others, the IC’s needs in terms of budget and recruitment issues, as well as
to present envisaged IC-related legislative changes. Such initiatives were
welcomed by IC.26
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In February 2009, the President set up an inter-ministerial committee to
debate the pace and outcomes of intelligence reform, come up with needed
changes regarding intelligence activity, and draft the nation’s first ever
National Intelligence Policy (PNI) to clarify roles and missions and
improve planning, guidance, and coordination, as well as provide avenues
for checks and balances of intelligence activity. After debates within the
Presidency and the National Defense Council (CDN), the PNI is now
under CCAI review. Alves introduced a Project of Amendment to the
Constitution (PEC), which, if approved, would include intelligence. It
would authorize such constitutionally legitimated functions as specifying
the IC’s roles and missions in Brazil’s national security, setting up
interagency channels, and establishing clear prerogatives for the IC’s
management, while also strengthening control and oversight. A new legal
framework for the IC might be worked out by the Executive, stipulating
new mandates for several agencies and setting up subsystems of defense
intelligence, criminal intelligence, financial intelligence, and strategic
intelligence. These are to be coordinated, respectively, by the Ministries of
Defense, Justice, Economy, and the GSI, which have otherwise
encountered some resistance from within the IC. A draft law on the CCAI
was initiated in 2008, but has not yet been enacted.27
Argentina
Since December 1983, Argentina has strived to transform its intelligence
community from being an instrument of the military dictatorship to an
intelligence system that serves democracy. Argentina’s National Intelligence
System was created on the ruins of former non-democratic agencies,
especially the former State Information Secretariat (SIDE) that had been
established in 1956, and the national Intelligence Center (CNI) established
in 1966. The current system consists of three agencies: the Secretariat of
Intelligence (SI), as the main intelligence body; the National Directorate
for Criminal Intelligence; and the National Directorate for Strategic
Military Intelligence. These agencies are civilian and military, and conduct
domestic (police=law enforcement), military, and foreign intelligence.
Argentina’s situation reveals the interest and preoccupation of the civilians
in the executive and legislative branches to curtail intelligence power and
privileges as a consequence of the human rights abuses and transgressions
committed during the non-democratic regime. Toward this end, civilian
policymakers have channeled their efforts for reforming intelligence toward
establishing and implementing democratic civilian control of the agencies,
to the detriment of effectiveness. The changes affected the military
intelligence, in that they involved considerable demilitarization, and limited
powers of domestic intelligence, civilian control and oversight by the
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Executive and Congress, as well as new legislation regarding intelligence
activities.
After setting up new agencies, the policymakers refined the legal
framework to delineate the roles, responsibilities, and missions of the
armed forces, intelligence, and police, set up interagency coordination
avenues, and stipulated civilian control and oversight of the intelligence
agencies. In parallel, a human rights policy was introduced during the
administration of Raul Alfonsı´n (1983–1989), and trials of the leaders of
the military juntas commenced in civilian courts. Democratic control and
oversight were implemented by the Executive through the successive
Presidents, who have been directly involved in monitoring intelligence
activity and changes; the Congress, through a Joint Committee for the
Oversight of Internal Security and Intelligence Activities and Agencies,
established in 1993; and the Judicial branch, meaning the court system.
Despite continued interest in achieving intelligence transparency, reform
has been less than perfect. An early challenge was the agencies’ strong
resistance. The civilian heads of the SIDE during the Alfonsı´n
administration encountered tremendous opposition from within the
armed forces and the military intelligence agency when attempting to
civilianize it, which led to the resignation of one civilian director. The
policymakers’ lack of knowledge and expertise about intelligence also
hampered reform. In April 1997, a Joint Committee for the Oversight of
Internal Security and Intelligence Activities and Agencies was set up to
provide the executive branch with findings regarding intelligence reform
and activity. In an ensuing report, the Committee noted significant faults
in the legal basis for intelligence, flawed interagency coordination, the
absence of a national strategic intelligence plan, and limited regional=
international cooperation. Corruption and legacies of the past have also
been problems, and more specifically, increases and spending of the
secret budget, including the discretionary use of secret expenditures.
Examples include the hijacking by Carlos Menem’s administration
(1989–1999) of public funds originally assigned by the Budget Law to
secret expenses for paying extra salaries and the informal distribution of
funds among public officials; alleged approval by Fernardo de la Ru´a’s
administration (1999–2001) for using secret expenditures for payment of
bribes to members of the Senate in 2000; continued tendencies to involve
the military in domestic intelligence and security, for political versus
national security reasons, including the November 1998 surveillance by
the Air Force’s intelligence agents of journalists and NGOs, and the
Army’s illegal intelligence activities against political parties, trade unions,
and university groups in 2000. These actions demonstrated a lack of
progress in the transparency and accountability of intelligence, let alone
in its effectiveness.
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The concern with effectiveness happened only after Argentina became a
target of two terrorist attacks in the early 1990s—the bombing of the
Embassy of Israel in 1992, and of the Asociacio´n Mutual Israelita
Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish community center building, in 1994, with a
total loss of life of 114—when the government began to realize the change
of the post–Cold War security environment. The two terrorist bombings in
Buenos Aires in the early 1990s demonstrated the intelligence agencies’
lack of capability to avert security threats and risks, and to inform
policymakers in due time. To boost the effectiveness and professionalism
of the intelligence community, a considerable number of personnel were
dismissed while qualified personnel were hired, and the secret budget was
reduced. Over time, interagency coordination as well as regional
intelligence cooperation have been improved. Judicial access to SIDE
secret accounts was enabled. The events of 11 September 2001 (9=11) made
policymakers aware of the need for effective intelligence, particularly from
the perspective of international and regional cooperation. This led to
Argentina’s more assertive involvement in various regional cooperation
initiatives, including the Tri-border Tripartite Command, the Mercado
Comu˘n del Sur (Common Market of the South) (MERCOSUR), and the
‘‘3 þ 1 Regional Cooperation Mechanism.’’ In addition, to boost
intelligence community effectiveness and transparency, a National
Intelligence Law was enacted in December 2001. The law granted greater
authority to the President vis-a`-vis the direction, guidance, and interagency
coordination of intelligence, gave more power to the Congressional
Committee (including oversight and audit of the intelligence budget),
provided for strengthened judicial control of intrusive intelligence practices
(e.g., wiretapping), promoted the political neutrality of intelligence, and
regulated intelligence education and training.
An ensuing decree approved a new statute for intelligence personnel,
including provisions pertaining to intelligence officers’ duties, rights,
retribution, retirement, and disciplinary practices. Important to intelligence
transparency have been the initiatives—materialized in a series of
presidential decrees or changes in the intelligence agencies—of Presidents
Nestor Kirchner and Cristina Ferna´ndez de Kirchner. These changes
included the protection of classified information and declassification of
information, on the actions of the Armed Forces; and the transfer of the
National Aeronautical Police, previously under the Air Force, to the
Ministry of Interior, which was renamed Airport Security Police (PSA).
Although these developments have neither settled the ongoing debate over
centralizing versus decentralizing intelligence, nor have they immediately
heralded more effective control and oversight, they are an important step
in intelligence reform, as has been the appointment of civilians as heads of
Argentina’s intelligence agencies.
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Peru
Peru reestablished democracy in the early 2000s, after the dictatorship of
Alberto Fujimori, and the ruthlessly effective support provided by the
Servicio Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), especially under Vladimiro
Montesino (1990–2000). Intelligence reform started with SIN’s abolishment
by President Fujimori in October 2000 through the promulgation of Law
No. 27,351 of 2000, pursuant to the disclosure of a video revealing
evidence of Montesinos’s involvement in various acts of corruption. Since
then, Peru has strived to reform and democratize its intelligence agencies
in parallel with police and defense reform. Currently, Peru’s National
Intelligence System (SINA) coordinates the following agencies: the
National Intelligence Council (COIN), the National Directorate for
Intelligence (DINI), Intelligence Agencies of the Defense and Interior
sectors, and the General Directorate for Security and Defense Affairs of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These agencies are both civilian and
military, and conduct domestic and foreign intelligence.
The current intelligence system is the creation of decisionmakers within the
executive and the legislative branches of government. Over the years,
policymakers have faced numerous interconnected challenges, which they
have only partially surmounted. One was their lack of expertise and
knowledge vis-a`-vis intelligence and its reform. Although they created new
agencies, they failed to develop a robust legal basis for them. Even if the
laws enacted in the early 2000s provided new roles, missions, and
interagency coordination for intelligence, they failed to provide for
effective legislative control and oversight.28 A first attempt toward
transparency was President Valentin Paniagua Corazao’s (2000–2001)
decision to create the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation (CVR) in
2001. Its role was to investigate, among others, crimes and human rights
abuses by state agencies during the internal armed conflict (1980–2000)
and the Fujimori regime, and provide recommendations to the successor
system’s functioning.
While the first CVR report, made public in 2003, called for the
implementation of democratic civilian control of the military intelligence
services, and emphasized the need for a legal framework while
strengthening COIN’S role as the highest body of the intelligence system, it
was not until 2006, when the law came into force that Peru’s intelligence
was brought under control. In addition, the leadership’s lack of expertise
and inability to deal with reform were reflected in poor decisions on firing
former SIN personnel or high-level security appointments. Although
rooting out SIN personnel, especially those involved in human rights
abuses, was necessary as proof of a move away from the past, and
although civilians embarked upon a purge of intelligence analysts and
POLICYMAKERS AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM 673
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 24, NUMBER 4
agents in the early 2000s, they failed to take into account the prospects of
recruitment, education, and training of new personnel to fill the resulting
vacuum of intelligence expertise.29 They even deactivated existing
education and training institutions, such as SINA’s strategic intelligence
course, that could have contributed to an increase of expertise. The
appointment in 2004 of retired military officers to key positions within the
intelligence system halted the brief effort to establish civilian control. And
when civilian experts from academia and NGOs were appointed heads of
the intelligence system, their impact on reform was minimal. In addition,
the Peruvian media revealed various scandals pertaining to illegal
wiretappings, the leaking and ‘‘selling’’ of classified intelligence reports,
and espionage, even after the passing of a law which provided for
enhanced intelligence management and control, thereby reflecting the
decisionmakers’ inability to handle reform.
The lack of a robust legal framework and control and oversight
mechanisms, coupled with the legacy of the past—including retention of
many SIN agents, who continued their nondemocratic modus operandi,
instability in the COIN leadership, and politicization—negatively impacted
reform. The SIN’s successor, COIN, is far from being a modern and
professional agency in the service of democracy. As a corrective, in 2004
then-President Alejandro Toledo created a Special Commission for
restructuring COIN. It assessed the progress in, and impediments to,
intelligence reform up to that year, and provided recommendations for an
effective trade-off between transparency, in particular establishment of
democratic control and oversight mechanisms, including control and
oversight of the budget, and effectiveness, in particular strengthening
interagency coordination. In line with the Commission’s recommendations,
Congress adopted a law in 2005, enacted in early 2006, which, together
with additional decrees in 2006 and 2007, established a new structure for
the National Intelligence System (SINA), and new personnel regulations
for intelligence agencies. Although SINA comprises all institutions engaged
in intelligence, COIN is responsible for coordinating intelligence and
counterintelligence activities. It reviews and sanctions the annual
intelligence plan, and forwards its recommendations to the Council of
National Security for adoption, as well as approves interagency
coordination and cooperation doctrine, criteria, and procedures. The 2005
law established a Congressional Intelligence Committee, which has the
authority to obtain classified and unclassified information from any of
SINA’s components, to investigate agencies ex officio, to supervise the
annual plan of intelligence and its derived policies, and to request an
annual secret report from the DINI. Yet the law neither stipulates control
of intelligence budget, although the Comptroller General of the Republic is
authorized to control special resources by the DINI Director, nor controls
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military intelligence, even if, admittedly, it is involved in the overall oversight
of SINA. The law also stipulates judicial review and procedures regarding
intelligence declassification. Yet, the law has several flaws as concerns
intelligence transparency: it does not prevent the appointment of either
active duty or retired military officers to key positions in the SIDE, whose
reluctance to change is a setback to democratic civilian control; and it does
not prevent the domestic collection of information on social and political
organizations and movements. To deal with these challenges, the
Congressional Committee in 2007 issued a secret report criticizing the
performance of the agencies. Then, in 2009, the Committee developed a
draft law to amend the 2006 law, which is pending approval.
Thus, although Peru’s decisionmakers, including members of Congress,
have shown interest in intelligence reform, including civilian democratic
control, transparency, and effectiveness, their efforts have yet to be fully
implemented.
Poland
Poland enjoyed a peaceful transition to democracy in 1989. Since then,
policymakers within the executive—the Prime Minister, leaders of the
Armed Forces, and others—and legislative branches of government have
channeled their efforts toward creating a functional intelligence
community. A series of reform initiatives, such as reorganizing old
intelligence agencies, downsizing personnel, assigning new roles and
missions, has led to Poland’s current IC, consisting of five agencies: the
Agency for Internal Security (ABW) and the Foreign Intelligence
Agency (AW), created in 2002, replacing the Office for State Protection
(UOP), the successor to Poland’s Communist security service (SB); the
Central Anticorruption Bureau (CBA), created in 2006; the Military
Intelligence Service (SWW) and the Military Counterintelligence Service
(SKW), created in 2006, replacing the Wojskowe Sluzby Informacyjne
(Military Information Services—WSI). In compliance with the legal
framework which comprises laws and regulations on the organization
and functioning of these agencies, as well as on the protection of
classified information, these organizations are military and civilian,
conduct domestic and foreign intelligence, including military and
defense, and have human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence
(SIGINT), and imagery intelligence (IMINT) capabilities.
The decisionmakers have placed the agencies under executive branch
control and guidance. The Prime Minister directs and coordinates
the activities of the ABW, AW, and CBA, while the Minister of Defense
directs the SWW and SKW. But both the Prime Minister and the
President receive SWW and SKW annual intelligence guidelines and
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end-of-year reports. A Board for Secret Services, equivalent to the U.S.
National Security Council, comprising the Prime Minister as its head, the
Ministers of Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance, the Head of
National Security Bureau, the Heads of intelligence agencies, and the
Head of the National Defense Commission in the first Parliament’s
Chamber [Sejm], as well as one Secretary, was created to foster the
coordination of all the agencies. In 2005, the Polish authorities established
yet another interagency coordinat ion body: the Off ice of the
Minister-Coordinator for Security Services. Not only does it seem to
duplicate the roles and responsibilities of the other agencies, but it lacks a
clear legal basis , thereby cast ing doubt on its lawfulness. The
decisionmakers also established legislative control and oversight by
creating a Special Parliamentary Committee for Secret Services within the
Sejm.
Notwithstanding these developments, the pace of intelligence reform has
been rather slow, and hampered by several challenges, including the
decisionmakers’ lack of interest and knowledge, and the legacy of the past.
In this context, while decisionmakers drew attention, and channeled their
efforts, to the need for downsizing legacy personnel and launched debates
as early as 1990 on the need to abolish the agencies created on the ruins of
the former nondemocratic secret services, not until 2002 were the new
agencies created and the legal framework implemented. Yet, once Poland
expressed its willingness to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and the European Union (EU), the two organizations’ accession
requirements and—after Poland’s integration into NATO in 1999 and the
EU in 2004—their membership responsibilities forced the policymakers to
reshape the Polish security system, including intelligence services. Thus, the
external incentive for Poland’s decisionmakers to overcome the challenges
of reform and balance intelligence effectiveness with transparency has
brought significant changes in the country’s intelligence structures, roles,
missions, legal bases, and accountability mechanisms.
First came the signing of various documents, understandings, and
partnerships which established NATO=EU pre-accession responsibilities
for Poland. Among them were the Association Treaty with the European
Community in 1991, the adoption of a National Strategy of Integration
(NSI) in 1997, the Partership for Peace (PfP) framework document in
1994, and the Act on Protection of Classified Information in 1999. These
elicited major changes in the activities and organization of the Polish
security services, including interagency and international cooperation. The
adoption of the National Security Strategy in 2000, prepared according to
NATO standards, gave the intelligence agencies new responsibilities,
namely to support Poland’s strategic goals. The abolishment of the UOP
in 2002 and the enactment of new laws on establishing the previously
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mentioned five agencies marked an opening toward effectiveness and
transparency of Poland’s intelligence agencies.
Notable, too, was the initiative of several policymakers to review the
nation’s intelligence activity. In 2004–2005, members of the Polish Supreme
Chamber of Control (NIK), a constitutional body under the Sejm that
monitors public and private institutions, issued reports and made surprise
visits to intelligence agencies to assess their transparency and effectiveness,
as well as the existing control and oversight mechanisms. The NIK report
found flaws in the legal framework for intelligence, including the
delineation of roles and missions, as well as in the effectiveness and
appropriateness30 of democratic control and oversight mechanisms. Then-
President Lech Kaczyn´ski demonstrated interest in intel l igence
transparency by declassifying and making public a report issued by the
UOP’s abolisher, Antoni Macierewicz, in 2007. This was the first time that
information on WSI activity had been made public.
Romania31
Romania embarked upon democratization in December 1989 after the
collapse of the Nicolae Ceaus¸escu regime, one of the most atrocious
Communist dictatorships in Central and Eastern Europe. The Communist
intelligence apparatus—the nefarious Securitate—was dismantled
immediately after the regime’s fall and placed indefinitely under the
jurisdiction of the military. Nevertheless, specific ethnic clashes led to the
creation of at least nine new agencies in March 1990. These agencies
preserved much of the infrastructure, logistics, personnel, and files of the
former Communist institution. Since then, Romania has endeavored to
reach a balance between effect iveness and transparency in the
post-Communist intelligence agencies. While the pursuit of transparency
was obvious, considering the Securitate’s atrocities during the Ceaus¸escu
regime, the focus on effectiveness can be explained by the decisionmakers’
awareness of various threats to Romania’s security, emanating from its
dangerous geographic surroundings, dominated by failed states and
conflicts, and such transnational threats as organized crime, terrorism, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. After a series of
reorganizations, the decisionmakers decreased the number of agencies from
nine to six by 2005: independent—the Romanian Intelligence Service
(SRI); the Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE); the Guard and Protection
Service (SPP), and the Special Telecommunication Service (STS); and
ministerial—the General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal
Protection (DGIPI) and the Directorate for General Information of the
Army (DGIA). The executive branch, which includes the President, the
National Defense Supreme Council (CSAT) coordinates all intelligence and
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security activities and agencies. A National Intelligence Community (CNI)
was created by the CSAT in 2005 to ease information and intelligence
sharing among all agencies, as well as the dissemination of relevant
materials to consumers. The decisionmakers have also progressively
developed a rich legal framework for intelligence, consisting of numerous
laws and regulations on the organization and functioning of the agencies,
interagency coordination, and protection of classified information, as well
as access to intelligence information and declassification. The various
agencies now conduct domestic, foreign, military, and police=law
enforcement intelligence in compliance with the legislation. They operate
under the mandate of the executive (through the President, Prime Minister,
and CSAT), legislative (through two permanent Committees in the two
chambers of the Parliament, two select committees, ad hoc committees, and
the Court of Audit), and are reviewed by the Judicial branch (through the
Constitutional Court and judges), as well as other mechanisms (such as the
Ombudsman).
Romania is an important case study of the role of policymakers in
intelligence reform, for at least two reasons. First, although policymakers
of the executive and legislative branches of the government have
contributed to the creation and development of the post-Communist
intelligence community, and although they sought to develop both
transparent and effective intelligence agencies, they cannot be entirely
credited for the progress of the reform. Rather, it was the ‘‘carrots and
sticks’’ approach of NATO and EU membership requirements—two
organizations which Romania very much desired to join—as well as a
vigilant media that motivated, stimulated, and=or compelled the Romanian
decisionmakers to reform intelligence.
During the first years of transition, the policymakers lacked knowledge on
intelligence reform, as reflected in many gaps in the legal framework for
intelligence, as well in their inability to perform effective intelligence
oversight, which allowed for IC transgressions and misbehavior. They also
had to deal with the agencies’ legacy of the past and their resistance to
reform, reflected in the perpetuation of former non-democratic personnel in
the newly created agencies, many in important positions, which continued
unlawful political police and politicization practices and blackmail. In
addition, the policymakers also had to implement other competing reform
priorities, for example, creating a new Constitution and developing a
political class. They also encountered endemic corruption, with Romania
being one of the most corrupt countries in the world. But the unanimous
desire to join NATO=EU helped them overcome these challenges. The
policymakers acquired expertise in intelligence through access to intelligence
literature, education, training with IC personnel, and from NGOs, media,
foreign experts, foreign visits, and experience sharing. They dealt with the
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legacy of the past and resistance to reform by vetting and removing Securitate
personnel, hiring new people who were not involved with Securitate, investing
in the professionalization of intelligence personnel, generally making
intelligence reform a priority. Besides the decisionmakers’ interest in joining
NATO and the EU, the media exposed scandals and irregularities regarding
intelligence reform that forced the policymakers to deal with these
challenges. Yet as Marius Oprea pointed out, after 1989, the new political
power had no intention to engage in open war against the Securitate, and
any ‘‘war’’ was played out exclusively in the media.32
Corruption, still high in Romania, remains a drawback. And the lack of
‘‘carrots and sticks’’ has, since Romania’s integration in NATO and EU,
led to a decreased interest on the part of policymakers, especially those in
the legislative branch, to continue democratic reform, particularly in
exercising proper oversight. Oddly, the legacy of the past is minimal, and
the lack of expertise, after twenty years of democracy and access to a rich
literature on intelligence, is not an issue. In fact, many civilian
decisionmakers and intelligence professionals are graduates of various
security courses. What hinders modernization and reform is a lack of
interest—a ‘‘hands-off’’ attitude toward intelligence and intelligence
reform, especially with regard to improving the legal framework for
intelligence. Although the decisionmakers have progressively developed a
rich legal framework, it has serious lacunae. As a corrective, the executive
proposed a package of five national security related laws back in
2005–2006, which, although undergoing several changes after open debates,
remains in the Parliament. Instead, political infighting and bad economy
are current preoccupations for parliamentarians.
The executive branch has been more supportive of broader reforms as a
means of raising public interest in intelligence and institutionalizing the
processes that support transparency and effectiveness. The government has
initiated debates and meetings on security and intelligence matters, among
them a discussion of the role of intelligence in a democratic society, and a
review of current national, regional, and global security threats.
Decisionmakers and intelligence professionals have jointly sought to enrich
Romania’s intelligence literature by publishing various books and articles
on intelligence and democracy with the goal of familiarizing Romanian
society with the concepts of ‘‘intelligence’’ versus ‘‘information,’’ and by
declassifying and publishing information on Romania’s prior intelligence
agencies. The decisionmakers have also invested in professionalization by
implementing better standards for recruitment, in parallel with Securitate
personnel removal and promotion of new personnel; continuous education
and training programs for intelligence personnel, including ethics, human
rights, transparency, and accountability; issuing security clearances to
permit access to classified information; and nurturing a responsibility for
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democracy. The CSAT has supported the SRI’s modernization program,
‘ ‘S t ra t eg i c V i s ion 2007–2010 , ’ ’ a imed a t comprehens ive de -
bureaucratization and an improved intelligence cycle, from decisionmakers
to intelligence officers and back.
Despite all these challenges, and bolstered by contemporary management,
Romania’s intelligence agencies continue to be effective, both domestically
and internationally, as acknowledged by not only foreign partners and
allies, but also the general public. Nevertheless, formal legislative oversight
processes need to be improved, while the media’s informal oversight
should continue even if often being sensationalist and profit-driven, in
order to prevent the agencies’ accumulation of too much power, especially
given the shakiness of today’s political and economic situation.
Spain
Spain peacefully transitioned to democracy in 1975, following the death of
General Francisco Franco. Since then, civilians in Spain, especially from
the executive branch, have endeavored to develop democratic intelligence
agencies that are both effective and under control.
Ever since the transition to democracy, policymakers have viewed
terrorism as the primary security challenge for Spain. From this
perspective, and later, from the perspective of EU and NATO membership
(1986), they deemed it necessary to develop an intelligence system in the
service of democracy. Intelligence reform in Spain started in 1977, when
Vice President Gutie´rrez Mellado set up Superior Defense Information
(CESID) by merging all intelligence agencies inherited from Franco, and
placed it under the Ministry of Defense. The CESID was replaced in 2001
by the National Intelligence Center (CNI), which also operates within the
Ministry of Defense. The CNI, Spain’s current intelligence agency,33 does
both domestic and foreign, including military, intelligence. Its products
are disseminated to the Presidency, which is the main user and also
the authority that decides on the recipients of intelligence, as well as to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense, the
Ministry of Economy and Finance, and the Ministry of Interior.
Democratic control of intelligence is carried out by the executive, the
legislative (through the Defense Committee of the Congress of Deputies),
and judicial (through the Supreme Court) branches. The rather secretive
Spanish security system is based on a 1968 law, which continues to
regulate access to official secrets.
Notwithstanding the policymakers’ interest in intelligence reform as part
of a wider objective—bringing the military under democratic control to
prevent a return to the past—balancing effectiveness with transparency in
Spain has been less than perfect. Policymakers have encountered several
680 FLORINA CRISTIANA MATEI AND THOMAS C. BRUNEAU
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
challenges and obstacles, some still present. As in Brazil and Romania, the
first obstacle was the resistance of the intelligence agencies to reform. The
CESID inherited the military and police personnel trained in the Franco
years, many in key positions within the directorate. Such personnel
continued their non-democratic practices, in particular, the illegal
surveillance of political figures, and also sought to oppose reform. Doubts
also arose over the CESID’s participation in the attempted coup d’e´tat of
23 February 1981. Another challenge has been the impossibility, based on
old regulations, of declassifying materials, including those pertaining to the
Franco dictatorship. Considering these impediments, it is not surprising
that the public perception of intelligence in Spain remains negative even
today. The stigma of the nondemocratic past is still there.
Lack of knowledge and expertise in intelligence reform, particularly with
regard to the exercise of effective democratic control of intelligence, as well
as political infighting, have also held back reform. For many years,
executive control of the CESID involved more or less personal ties between
the Minister of Defense and the director of the service, rather than a
formally established control and oversight channel. In 1995, Juan Alberto
Perote, head of the CESID Operations Group, was accused of leaking
1,200 documents from the agency, containing information on CESID’s
wiretapping of politicians, journalists, and other key public figures for
blackmail. The strong media pressure following this scandal resulted in the
resignation of the country’s Vice President, the Minister of Defense, and
the director of CESID. Another telling example is the CESID’s 1998 illegal
surveillance of the ETA’s political wing, Herri Batasuna, which the
government ignored. Also related to the limited expertise and knowledge in
intelligence matters is the lack of policy-driven intelligence, specifically, the
lack of requirements from policymakers, and the absence of a relationship,
including feedback, between the analysts and the consumer. This lack of
knowledge is mirrored in the faulty interagency coordination of all security
institutions by the executive. Spain’s intelligence agency is part of an
amalgam of competing security bureaucracies with overlapping
responsibilities, including the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior,
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Although the idea of interagency
coordination has been advocated since 1976, and even tentatively
materialized since mid-1980s—for anti-terrorism purposes—Spain still
lacks real interagency coordination. It is not surprising, then, that Spain’s
intelligence has not been a major player in international deployments. The
Defense Committee has also been incapable of exercising proper
supervision of intelligence, in particular oversight of the budget, and
particularly the use of secret money for the ‘‘dirty war’’ against ETA. The
same applies to committees of inquiry regarding intelligence misdemeanors
or failures. For example, the committee established to investigate the lethal
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terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid failed to reach an agreement on
what caused the failure of intelligence to prevent them, let alone provide
recommendations regarding intelligence activity improvement to ensure
that such attacks would not happen again. Relentless political infighting
and mutual blame between members of the two big parties comprising the
committee, the Socialist Party and the Popular Party, led to the stalemate.
Moreover, the policymakers in charge of intelligence reform first learned
of many intelligence illegalities from the press. As in Romania, the media,
whether sensationalist and profit-driven or not, has stepped in as a more
effective oversight mechanism than the formal structures, and acted as a
catalyst for reform, change, and reprimand. A recent example is the 2009
media coverage of the CNI’s misuse of public funds for personal
pleasures and nepotism under the then-Director, Alberto Saiz. The case
also exposed the inability of the formal control and oversight bodies to
properly monitor the agency and its personnel. The media reporting
ultimately led to Saiz’s resignation.
The attempts of policymakers to overcome these challenges through such
reforms as replacing the CESID with the CNI, enacting a law on the
organization and functioning of the Center, and enforcing prior judicial
approval of intrusive CNI activities by a Supreme Court magistrate have
not much improved either the effectiveness or accountability of
intelligence. A security and intelligence culture has sluggishly emerged,
particularly after the Cold War. Since 1997, the Spanish Institute for
Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense has developed an outreach
program, which has knitted together the Armed Forces and civil society,
including academia, via courses, conferences, seminars, and research
initiatives. Intelligence promotion has been accomplished through the
CNI’s National Office for Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence. While the
perception of intelligence has admittedly changed within academia, it has
yet to change among Spain’s citizenry.
Russia
Russia is a stunning case of democratic regress. Since the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, Russia has been incapable of providing basic human rights,
freedoms, and liberties for its citizens. It has fallen short in permitting
political freedom, and has hindered the development of a vigorous civil
society able to check the government. Thus, the country cannot be
considered a democracy.34 Russian’s political system has instead evolved
from a super-presidential republic to what scholar Ivan Krastev terms
‘‘democracy’s doubles,’’ meaning ‘‘regimes that claim to be democratic and
may look like democracies, but which rule like autocracies.’’35 Arguably,
Russia’s intelligence agencies continue to be the chief prop of the regime, in
682 FLORINA CRISTIANA MATEI AND THOMAS C. BRUNEAU
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE
particular the executive, which dominates all other branches. They continue to
conduct their clandestine activities against the population. Although
intelligence reform has been on the Russian decisionmakers’ agenda, the
purpose of reform has not been the balancing of effectiveness with
transparency, but rather, developing intelligence agencies that serve and are
controlled by the executive, especially the Presidency.
Russia’s current intelligence system is an inheritance from the Committee
of State Security (KGB), which was split into several agencies, as follows:
. the External Intelligence Service (SVR) of the Russian Federation, as the
successor of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, responsible for foreign
intelligence;
. the Federal Security Service (FSB), the former Ministry of Security, as the
successor to the Second and Third Chief Directorates, responsible for
counterintelligence and military counterintelligence, respectively;
. the Fourth Directorate, for transportation security;
. the Directorate for Protection of the Constitution;
. the Sixth Directorate, tasked with combatting economic crime and corruption;
. the Seventh Directorate, for surveillance and wiretapping;
. the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI),
as the successor to the Eighth Chief Directorate (communications and SIGINT);
. the Main Guard Directorate (GUO), as the successor to the Ninth Directorate, to
provide the physical security of high officials;
. the Committee for Protection of Russian Borders, as the successor to the Border
Guards;
. the Main Directorate for Special Projects, attached to the office of the President of
the Russian Federation, as the successor to the Fifteenth Directorate, for the
maintenance and protection of secure underground facilities for the leadership;
and,
. the unchanged Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU).
In accordance with the legal framework, consisting of several laws and
presidential directives, including laws on organization and functioning of
intelligence agencies and ministry of defense, on fighting terrorism, on
state secrets, and on national security, the various agencies conduct a wide
range of domestic, foreign, military, and civilian intelligence and
counterintelligence activities. They are not, however, an intelligence
community. Although a Security Council does some coordination of
intelligence and security activities, no formal horizontal links exist among
the agencies, nor is there an equivalent of a director of national
intelligence. The intelligence agencies report directly to the President, while
the GRU also reports to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General
Staff. The executive branch has granted them tremendous power and
insulation from external scrutiny.
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Since 1991, the intelligence agencies have been major tools and players in
the political class’s constant struggle for power and wealth. The 1993
Constitution, written to accommodate then-President Boris Yeltsin’s
political and personal interests and needs, increased the powers of the
executive vis-a`-vis intelligence, to the detriment of the legislative and
judiciary branches. To consolidate their power, Russia’s Presidents have
personally appointed select intelligence personnel (siloviki)36 in various
key positions within the government. Examples include Yevgeniy Primakov, a
former director of the SVR (1991–1996), who was allegedly involved with the
KGB, and became Prime Minister in 1999, and former KGB officer Nikolai
Bordyuzha, who became head of the Presidential Administration. Many other
former KGB officers were appointed to very important positions, including
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council,
chief military prosecutor, and Deputy Director of the official ITAR-TASS
news agency. The siloviki are an ‘‘active reserve’’ in that they keep their rank
and salary in their original agency, and report to the agency, while operating
in the civilian bureaucracy from which they get a second salary. Such reliance
on siloviki made it possible for Vladimir Putin in 2008, when appointed Prime
Minister, to change the balance of power from the Kremlin (the Headquarters
of the President) to Moscow’s White House (the Headquarters of the Prime
Minister), even if President Dmitri Medvedev has also used siloviki.
Considering all these facts, that intelligence officers and their agencies
opposed changes and checks and balances is not surprising. The executive
did whatever it could to weaken legislative and judicial control. With
regard to legislative control and oversight, the two chambers of
Parliament—the Federation Council and the Duma—have been highly
penetrated by individuals appointed directly by the President, or by
Intelligence members of the presidential party, including former KGB=FSB
and MVD personnel. While the Federation Council’s Intelligence
Committee deals primarily with issues of salaries and benefits for agency
personnel, the Duma’s committee deals with writing, adopting, and
amending new legislation in line with the President’s preferences and
approving the budget—which is almost entirely classified even for members
of parliament. No committee supervises intelligence operations. Although
an Accounting Chamber, equivalent to the U.S. General Accountability
Office can audit intelligence expenditures, it cannot do so with regard to
operations. Another handicap for Parliament is its lack of authority to
conduct investigations related to intelligence. A telling example is the
investigation of the 2004 hostage taking in Ossetia.37 Although a joint
committee was created with then-President Putin’s approval to investigate
how the agencies handled the situation, it was nothing more than a way to
turn away public anger over the government’s failure to stop terrorism.
The committee’s report, released in 2006, commended the actions by the
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central government in Moscow, while admonishing the local authorities of
the Republic of North Ossetia.
Putin’s administration enacted a law in 2005 which severely limits the
Federal Assembly’s ability to conduct inquiries on intelligence. No
parliamentary inquiries have been held since the adoption of this law. With
regard to judicial review, the judiciary is now part of the executive, which
has brought in former intelligence personnel and implemented legislation
that impedes judicial scrutiny of intelligence. Likewise, external oversight
by civil society, including the media, is absent. The executive—the
President as much as the intelligence agencies—actually controls, monitors,
and neutralizes the activity of NGOs and the media.
The leadership’s use of intelligence for personal gain and the resulting
lack of supervision and oversight, have begotten corruption and a loss of
professionalism by the officers of the security agencies. The FSB’s
domination within the government has fueled bribery, torture, and all
types of abuse and misconduct. With the support of intelligence
personnel, the Russian government has become one of the most corrupt
in the world, ranking number 154 out of 178 on the Transparency
International listing in 2010.38 Under these circumstances, even the
effectiveness of intelligence is questioned. On the one hand, Russia’s
external intelligence service has proven its effectiveness on several
occasions, including its penetration of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the 1990s, its correct
estimates of the threat from Afghanistan’s Taliban movement, and its
2002 estimates that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan rather than Iraq were the
centers of gravity in the Global War on Terror. On the other hand, other
examples, such as its failure to predict the outcome of Yugoslavia’s 2000
elections which cost Slobodan Milosevic his job, its alleged prediction of
a prolonged conventional conflict, and the apparent ineffectiveness
of Russian illegal operatives arrested in the United States in June 2010
have cast doubt about their capabilities.
ANALYZING THE CASE STUDIES
Based on our survey of seven countries, six of which have undertaken a
democratic reform of intelligence, the following key points vis-a`-vis
policymakers’ contribution to intelligence reform are evident.
At a minimum, intelligence reform requires political will and interest on
their part. The incentive to reform intelligence can include:
1. external, e.g., carrots and sticks from NATO and the EU as in Romania, Poland,
and, somewhat less, Spain;
2. prestige, e.g., Romania, and Brazil in international peace operations;
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3. direct interest in one component of the reform—transparency or effectiveness—
for rational grounds, e.g., punish nondemocratic regime abuses and prevent the
return of those practices in the new democracy, or awareness of threats;
4. a crisis or failure; or
5. a combination of some or all of these.
To prevent a return to the past, policymakers in six of the seven countries—
Russia excluded, as they do not pursue democratic consolidation—have
primarily sought to bring intelligence under control and, hence, increase
the transparency dimension of intelligence reform. In four of these
countries (Romania, Poland, Spain, and later Brazil), policymakers have
also sought intelligence effectiveness, motivated by
1. external incentives (Romania, Poland, Spain),
2. awareness of threats (Romania, Poland, Peru, and more recently, Brazil),
3. prestige (Romania, Poland, Brazil), and
4. crises (Romania, Spain).
Of the six countries seeking IC control, only in Romania, Poland, and
perhaps Spain has democratic control also contributed to intelligence
effectiveness, yet probably still from the perspective of external drive that
influenced decisionmakers. Those countries that had an external drive and
incentive for reform have been more successful than the others in terms of
reform. Nevertheless, when the external push disappears, reform tends to
atrophy or stagnate, as it did in Romania. Intelligence reform is, therefore,
not a linear process, while past experience is no guarantee of continued
success.
But interest alone does not ensure effective reform. The case of Peru has
shown that policymakers have been interested in intelligence reform, due
to the legacy of the past and ongoing security challenges, but reform has
so far been ineffective, which leads to the second issue: expertise. In most
of the countries examined here, at least at the beginning of transition,
policymakers lacked knowledge on how to deal with intelligence. We also
found that reform initiatives tend to disappear with a change of
government—as in Romania and Brazil, in which the leaders with the
political will are replaced by others lacking it, or with the lack of external
incentives (e.g., Romania). From the four case studies of nations that were,
or had been, military dictatorships (Spain, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru), we
saw that the decisionmakers’ main focus was to increase transparency and
accountability. Where too much focus was placed on developing
democratic control and accountability, security was negatively affected,
hence, policymaking has also suffered, as in Argentina. And, where
reform, especially to increase effectiveness, has been pursued after a crisis,
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it was far from successful (Argentina and Spain). Policymakers have
therefore had more difficulty dealing with military intelligence in seeking
to balance effectiveness with transparency.
For countries that achieved some success in either transparency or
effectiveness, or both, in intelligence, time is very important. Even in
long-established democracies, having intelligence agencies that are both
effective and accountable does not occur overnight. The same applies to
emerging democracies, but more so.
Although corruption and the misuse by decisionmakers of intelligence
personnel and budget for personal and political reasons have been
encountered in all countries, only Russia embodies these problems on a
regular basis. That can be explained by the overall lack of interest in
democratization of the country.
This article analyzes the potential contribution of policymakers to the
democratic reform of intelligence and draws from the experience of seven
developing democracies (Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Poland, Romania, and
Spain) and Russia. Our research has indicated that, although democratic
reform of intelligence is not always an urgent or appealing objective, it is
not ultimately an impossible job for policymakers.
All six countries that attempted to democratize intelligence were not able
to easily overcome the past. For many years, they had to fight many
challenges. Nevertheless, in at least four of them—Poland, Brazil,
Romania, and Spain—the decisionmakers have managed to institutionalize
agencies that are either transparent or effective, or both.
Our study of democratic security, including intelligence, institution-
building suggests that civilian policymakers are the key players in the
intelligence process and reform.
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